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Abstract: Securing information system becomes the highlight of technology following quick 
development of computer networking and the Internet. People have known the method to enforce 
security over a database, but the necessities to get more secure system never reach boundaries. 
Now days the trend of information system is the open connection system where users are able to 
access system from many places. It leads the involvement of user access control as a part of 
database security since it takes a big role in governing access request of each user. This security 
component serves as a part of defense to secure data contained in the system. Development of 
user access control began on the early of seventies with DAC technology. Right now technology 
of user access control has reached sophisticated method with RBAC, but development of 
organization using information system and the development of information system itself push the 
improvement of user access control technology. This paper provides information about security 
system with the emphasis on user access control, which includes DAC, MAC and RBAC and the 
implementation of each user access control in security model. Comparison of each user access 
control method is given at the end of the paper. 
Keyword: Database Security, Security, User Access Control, Access Control 
1. Introduction 
In the recent development of computer and networking database security is facing a big 
challenges to protect information contained in the information system. There are a lot of possible 
event leads to security breach over a database, and therefore causing security violations. Security 
violation is the condition when the security mechanism fails to protect information contained in 
the system. (Krause et. aI, 1997) classified security violations into three categories: 
a. Improper release of information, which has the relevancy with the reading process done by 
the unauthorized user. 
b. Improper modification of data, which includes information mishandling and modification by 
unauthorized user. 
c. Denial of service, which prevents user from using system resources or accessing data. 
Potential events causing security violation can be defined as a threat. (Khelalfa, 1997) 
classified the threat as accidental and intentional. The examples of accidental threat are natural 
disasters, human errors and the errors in the hardware and software of computer. On the other 
hand, the intentional threat can be called as an attack as it is done intentionally by somebody or 
an organization to offence an information system that brings the dangerous condition to that 
,system. The examples of this threat are a hostile agent that modifies the data of the database 
improperly and the user who abuse his privileges. 
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There are three aspects that must be considered in conducting security over a database. These 
aspects are secrecy, integrity and availability. Secrecy is the protection from improper 
information disclosure. This protection prevents unauthorized user getting the information by 
direct retrieval or logical inference ,(indirect retrieval). Integrity is the protection from improper 
modification of information. The forbidden events are "append" and "write" access to database 
by unauthorized user, insertion of false data and destruction of data. Availability is related with 
the availability of system resources and information, it means the information and system 
resources must always be available when the authorized user access them, and the system must 
not deny the operation or service run by the authorized user. 
The mechanisms to gain those security aspects are discussed in this paper with the emphasis 
on user access control and its implementation in the security model. The explanation of user 
access control technology that comprises DAC, MAC and RBAC will be given in the later 
section, whereas the capability of each method to cater organization requirement that consist of 
business and military environment will be discussed in the separate chapter. The remaining of this 
paper is organized as the following: 
Section 2 gives a brief explanation about each mechanism that is possible to be done in 
conducting security. Section 3 explains more about user access control method that consist of 
DAC, MAC and RBAC and how they work. Section 4 explains about security model to 
implement each user access control method. Section 5 gives a discussion on each access control 
technique by comparing each other, and the involvement of user access control in the 
organization will also be explained in this section. Conclusion of this paper containing proposed 
future research direction is given in section 6. 
2. Security Control 
Security control is the effort to perform security over a database using a certain mechanism. 
(Denning, 1983) classified security control into: 
a. Flow control 
b. Inference control 
c. Cryptographic control 
d. Access control 
Flow control governs information flowing from one security level to another security level 
(Sandhu, 1993). It prevents the flowing of information contained in an object into the less 
protected object. The information flowing can be happened explicitly, e.g. through a copy, or 
implicitly, e.g. through a hidden program such as Trojan horse and virus (Castano et. al, 1994; 
Mcl.ean, 1990). This control permits the flowing of information only if one of the two following 
condition satisfied, i.e. the source object and the destination object have the same protection level 
or the source object has the lower protection level than the destination object. 
Inference control prevents the information disclosure done by unauthorized user who uses 
many ways of deduction (Khelalfa, 1997). The focus of this mechanism is to deter indirect 
detection to the information. Cryptographic control prevents the information to be understood by 
the unauthorized user (Menezes et. al, 1996). This mechanism converts the information into a 
different form of information using a certain way. Only the authorized users are able to 
understand the meaning of information. 
Access control manages and regulates the direct access to the information system. This 
mechanism performs security control based on the security policies supplied to the system. As it 
has the function to regulate the access request of each user, it deals with individual user registered 
in the system. In the system implementation, access control mechanism is enforced in the security 
model (McLean, 1994). Further description on the security model will be given in section 4. From 
this point, paper will focus more on the user access control and its mechanism. 
Jilid 12, Bil. 2 ( Disember 2000 ) Jurnal Teknologi Maklumat 
104 
3.	 Access Control 
Access control is the mechanism. to obtain security control over the database by governing the 
direct access to the information system based on the access policies supplied to the system 
(Sandhu and Samarati, 1994). Access control must ensure that every access to the system is 
occurred exclusively (Castano et. ai, 1994). The access control system comprises the following 
components: 
a.	 Subject is the active entities accessing system resources. Subject can be a user or a process, 
and the system must be protected from this component. 
b.	 Object is the passive entities that must be protected from getting the access by unauthorized 
subject. Object can be considered as the system resource. 
Access control can be classified into the following categories: 
I.	 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
2.	 Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
3. Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
 
The explanation of those methods will be given in section 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 respectively.
 
3.1. Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
The DAC governs the access of the subject to the object based on the user's identity and 
authorization rules applied to the system (Pernul, 1995; Baraani-Dastjerdi et. ai, 1996). User's 
identity and authorization rules are used tc? specify the access rights owned by the user such as 
read, write, execute, open, close, etc. The architecture of DAC can be shown in the figure I. 
Access Request 
Use r 
'-----------+1 Identification 
Checker 
Permitted 
Privilege 
Checker 
Denied 
Figure 1. DAC architecture 
Every access request to the information system is passed through the user identification 
checker to define who made the request. After the user could be identified, the privileges checker 
compare the access request with the privilege list, which consist of the privileges belongs to each 
user. In here the decision whether the access is denied or permitted is made. The other 
'characteristic of DAC is the condition that the users are permitted to have the privilege to 
propagate the access right of the object belongs to them to the other user (Pernul, 1995; McLean, 
1990). 
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Due to its simplicity, DAC has been adopted in various systems such as UNIX, AS/400 and 
Windows NT. In those systems, user is allowed to have its own files and to grant the permission 
of accessing those files to other users. Thus, user becomes the administrator of its own data. 
3.2. Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
The MAC governs the access of the subject to the object in the system based on the 
classification level owned by subject and object (McLean, 1990; Pernul, 1995; Baraani-Dastjerdi, 
1996). This access control applies the tight mechanism and introduces multilevel data to manage 
and regulate the access request. Every subject and every object are assigned the security level 
based on how important the subject and how secret the object in the system (McLean, 1990; 
Sandhu and Samarati, 1994). The architecture of the MAC is depicted in the figure 2. 
Access Request 
D--------~ 
Use r Security 
Identification Level 
Checker Checker 
DeniedPe rm i t t e d 
Figure 2. MAC architecture 
Every access request is passed through user identity checker to recognize the user who makes 
the request. After the identification of user is known, then security level checker compares the 
security level of object being accessed and the security level of subject made an access based on 
the security level list. The output of security checker is the decision to permit or deny the access 
request.. 
Like the one proposed by Bell-LaPadula, security level can be classified into TS (top secret), 
S (secret), C (confidential) and U (unclassified) which the TS > S > C > U. Subject is permitted to 
access an object if security level of subject is greater or equal than the security level of object. If 
an object owns security level S, a subject that is allowed to access this object must have security 
level TS or S. 
Not many systems adopted this method. Assigning security level to every user and object in 
the system is not an easy task, especially for the big system that contains many users and data 
(Sandhu and Samarati, 1994). An example of the system that adopted this method is Sea View 
model (Castano et. aI, 1994). 
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3.3. Role Based Access Control (RBAC) 
RBAC controls the access request of a subject to an object based on the roles that is supplied 
to the system. A role is the functions or transactions in which a user is permitted to perform 
within an organization (Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992). A tole can belong to an individual user or a 
group of users. The information contained in the role includes the separation of duties, 
responsibilities and qualifications of the user (Baraani-Dastjerdi et. aI, 1996). The roles must be 
maintained and updated to follow any modification within the organization. Therefore if there are 
any modification in the organization such as a new user is added to the system, some users resign 
from the organization or some users are moved from one department to another, the system is still 
able to control access request to the database. Role maintenance and updating are the 
responsibilities of system administrator. The architecture of RBAC is depicted in figure 3. 
Access Request 
Use r Role s D---------~ Identification Checker 
Checker 
DeniedPermitted 
Figure 3. RBAC architecture 
Every access request is passed through the user checker to recognize who issued the request. 
After the user made. the request is known, then the request is compared with the roles owned by 
the user to specify whether the request is permitted or denied. If the request satisfies the roles 
belong to the user, request will be permitted, otherwise it is denied. 
(Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992) specified the differences between RBAC and DAC as the 
followings: 
a. RBAC governs the access request based on the function of each user as a part of the 
organization, whereas DAC governs the access request based on the ownership of each 
object. 
b. DAC allows users to pass their privilege to the others, whereas RBAC does not allow this 
operation since the objects are owned by the organization and the users just follow their 
function in the organization. 
4. Security Model 
As stated in section 2, security model is the mechanism to enforce access control method. The 
objective of security modeling is to produce a conceptual model based on the requirement that 
describe the protection need by the system (McLean, 1994). Since security model deals with 
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conceptual model, it must be freed from any constraint of the implementation such as software 
constraint, operating system constraint, hardware constraint, etc (Castano et. ai, 1994). 
With respect to user access control, security model can be categorized into three groups, i.e., 
discretionary security model, mandatory security model and role based security model. The same 
with access control system, security model also applied the same definition of subject and object. 
Subject is the active entities that access the object and object is the passive entities that must be 
protected. 
4.1. Discretionary Security Model 
As stated in its name, this model aims to enforce DAC (Pernul, 1995), therefore the bases of 
this model are the users identity and the authorization rules supplied to the system. In this area, 
several models were proposed to formalize security mechanism under DAC. The first model 
appeared was access matrix model that was proposed by Lamson (1971) and extended by Graham 
and Denning (1972) and finally formalized by Harrison, Ullman and Ruzzo (1976). To represent 
security mechanism, this model uses a matrix. The matrix correlates subject, object and the 
authorization owned by subject to each object. If S is a set of subjects (active entities), ° is a set 
of objects (passive entities) and A is the authorization of subject to object, then the access matrix 
model can be shown in figure 4. 
S ubjects 
S 1 
S 2 
Objects 
o 1 o 2 o 3 
A[s1,o1] A[s1,o2] A[s1,o3] 
A[s2,o1] A[s2,o2] A[s2,o3] 
S 3 A[s3,o1] A[s3,o2] A[s3,o3] 
Figure 4. Access matrix model 
As shown in figure 4, each row in the matrix represents a subject and each column represents 
an object. The authorization owned by each subject to each object represented by A[s,o] is the 
entity correlating a subject to an object. This entity denotes what subject can do to an object. Take 
an example on the relation of subject S1 and object °I. The possible access can be taken by 
subject S1 to object 01 is represented using A[SI,OI] in which it can comprises the predefined 
operation of subject to object such as read, write, grant, modify, etc. 
The other model in this area is Take-Grant model that was proposed by Jones (1976). This 
model is an extension of access matrix model, to represent the authorization this model uses a 
graph structure instead of a matrix. Figure 5 shows the mechanism applied in this model. 
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y 
x x 
r,wr,w 
z z 
Figure 5. Take-Grant model 
Figure 5 shows the step taken to grant the read access to object z. The grantor is x that has the 
grant access to object y and has the read and write access to object z, therefore x is capable to 
pass the read access to object z to subject y. In doing that operation, x takes his access right (in 
this case is the read operation) and sends it to y. After that, y instantly is able to access z using 
read operation, but y is still not able to write z before x or another user grant write operation to it. 
4.2. Mandatory Security Model 
This model aims to enforce MAC (Pernul, 1995). The base of this model is the security 
classification of subject and object. Since this model deals with the multilevel data, it is called 
multilevel security. The two well-known and fully established models in this area are Bell­
LaPadula and Biba models. Bell-LaPadula model was proposed by Bell and LaPadula (1973, 
1974a, I 974b, 1975). To perform security mechanism, this model classifies security class to 
subject and object in the system, i.e., top secret (TS), secret (S), confidential (C) and Unclassified 
(U) which TS > S > C > U. Security classes is depicted in figure 6. 
s/o ITop s~~~~~ _ 
s/o Secret 
s/o Confidential 
s/o Unclassified 
Figure 6. Security classes in Bell-LaPadula model 
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Bell-LaPadula model imposes two axioms in handling multilevel data: 
a. The simple security property 
A subject cannot have the read access to an object which security class is higher than the 
security class of the subject (no read up). 
b. The *-property 
A subject has the write access to an object which security class is higher than or equal to 
the security class of the subject. It has the read access to an object which security class is 
lower than or equal to the security class of the subject. It has the read and the write access to 
the object which security class is equal to the security class of subject. If f(s) is the security 
level of subject and f(o) is the security level of object, then each access right can be 
represented as the following: 
Write: f(s):::; f(o)
 
Read: f(s) ~ f(o)
 
ReadIWrite: f(s) =f(o)
 
These axioms are shown in figure 7. With these axioms, this model aims to prevent 
unauthorized release of information by achieving information secrecy. 
,/f(o) {leVel n 
write uccesL level i + I 
f(s). level i ==> reud/w rite ==> f(o). level i 
~ )reUd a c c e ssIeve I i-I ' l f( 0) 
level I J 
i: u n y nurn ber represents security c la s s 
Figure 7. Axioms of Bell-LaPadula model 
Biba model was proposed by Biba (1977) applies similar principles like Bell-LaPadula for 
protecting information integrity instead of secrecy. The security classes in this model are crucial 
(C), very important (VI), important (I) and unclassified (U) which C > VI > I > U. Unlike Bell­
Lal'adula model which applies "no read up" operation, Biba model applies "no write up" 
operation. A subject cannot have a write access to an object which security class is higher than 
the security class of that subject (no write up). A subject cannot have the read access to an object 
which security class is lower than the security class of that subject (no read down). With these 
axioms this model aims to protect the system from unauthorized modification of information by 
achieving information integrity. 
The sea view model proposed by Denning (1987) combines both MAC and DAC. This model 
relies on two layers, i.e., MAC model and TCB (Trusted Computing Base) model. MAC model 
performs MAC and classifies an access class that has a secrecy component (secrecy class) and an 
integrity component (integrity class). The secrecy class in the model corresponds to the secrecy of 
Bell-LaPadula model, whereas the integrity class corresponds to the integrity class of Biba model. 
TCB model performs DAC and defines multilevel relations that are resulted from the 
classification of data in MAC model. The information in the TCB model is stored on the object 
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that is mediated by MAC model (Castano et. aI, 1994). The components of the Sea View model 
can be shown in figure 8. 
_ 
Bell-LaPadulaS ecrecy 
MAC < model 
model 
Integrity- Biba model 
Sea View 
model 
TCB .... Discretionary Access 
model Control 
Figure 8. The components of Sea View model 
4.3. Role Based Security Model 
This model aims to perform RBAC. (Sandhu et. aI, 1996) defined a family of four conceptual 
models that is known as RBAC96. This model comprises RBACO, RBAC1, RBAC2 and RBAC3. 
RBACO is the base model that specifies minimum requirement for the system that fully supports 
RBAC. The elements contained in RBACO are users, roles, permissions and sessions. Those 
components are the basis of Role-Based security model. RBACI and RBAC2 are based on the 
RBACO and add an independent feature to the model. The independent feature of RBAC 1 is the 
role hierarchies, which corresponds to the permission inheritance from the other roles. And the 
independent feature of RBAC2 is the constraint, which corresponds to the restriction of roles. 
RBAC3 consolidates all of those models, i.e., RBACO, RBACI and RBAC2. The complete 
architecture of RBAC96 is depicted in figure 9. 
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Role Hierarchy 
UserAssignment 
PA c P x R 
UA c U x R-------------­
S ~ U : a function mapping each session to the single user 
S ~ 2R : a function mapping each session to a set of roles 
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Figure 9. The complete architecture of Role Base Security model. 
The other component appeared in this model are role hierarchies and constraint. Role 
hierarchies are used to structure the roles based on the organization structure. As stated earlier 
as a role can contain some permission and permission can be used by many roles. In this model, 
users do not directly get the permission to access objects, the permission will be derived through 
a role. With this method, access request can be controlled and arranged based on the function of 
the user within the organization.. The session is directly established during the user active in the 
system. Each session is associated with a single user, and considers that a single user can have 
many roles. The representations of this component are: 
As stated earlier in this section the basics components constructing the model are user, role, 
permission and session. These components build the base model (RBACO) and denoted by U, R, 
P and S respectively. User is the active entities use the system resources, usually user is a human 
being. Role is a job function that is done by users within the organization as explained in section 
1.2.3. Permission is the access right to one or more objects in the system. 
The relations that appeared in the system are user assignment and permission assignment. 
User assignment connects users and roles. This relation can be defined as many to many relations 
and represented by: 
as a user can have many roles and a role can belong to many users. Permission assignment 
connects roles and permissions and it is also many to many relations and represented by: 
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this component is used in RBACI and RBAC3. Role hierarchies consider the authorization and 
the responsibilities of the users within the organization. Tne example of role hierarchies is 
depicted in figure 10, which represents the relation of roles contained in Accounting department. 
Accounting Manager 
Account Payable Account Receivable 
-. \ Accounting Employee 
Figure 10. Role hierarchies 
Constraint is used in RBAC2 and RBAC3. This component is used to apply more restriction 
to the system and to perform organization' policy. For instance, most organization will not allow 
the same user having the roles of purchasing manager and the roles of account payable manager 
since such permission can lead to the fraudulent dealings. Constraint can be used to restrict this 
permission by giving some condition to the roles and hence restrict the user from getting both 
roles. 
With respect to the figure 9 constraints can be applied to the user assignment, permission 
assignment and the session. The example of the constraint that is applied to the user assignment is 
the restriction, which the user is allowed to have only one role. It supports separation of duty. The 
constraint for permission assignment can be applied in the same manner like constraint applied 
for user assignment. For instance, the certain permission is allowed to be assigned to one role 
only. This method will support separation of duties, Constraint that is assigned to the session can 
be used to limit the number of session allowed for each user and the user can exercise the certain 
number of the roles only. 
5. Discussion 
Various methods have been used to approach how the system governs the access on their 
resources. DAC and MAC have been used by the people from along time ago to formalize 
security mechanism on the information system. DAC is known for its flexibility in implementing 
security mechanism, therefore it can be applied in almost all of the information system (Sandhu 
and Samarati, ]994). But DAC has a significant drawback in conducting security mechanism 
since the permissions of each user are specified and granted by system administrator (Ferraiolo 
and Kuhn, ]994). It makes the system has a great dependencies on the system administrator rather 
than the organization guidelines, therefore it creates a bigger possibility that the privilege is 
granted to inappropriate user. 
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Moreover, DAC conducts security mechanism based on the ownership of each object, so the 
system allows users to own an object (Castano et. al, 1992; Mcl.ean, 1994). For the users who 
own an object, they have all of the privilege to access that object including the privilege for 
passing the permission of that object to the other user. It brings a difficult situation for the 
security administrator to monitor system security due to uncontrolled distribution of privileges. 
User who does not have any privilege to access an object, still be able to access that object by 
getting the privilege from the other user who pass this privilege to him without any permission 
from system administrator. Once the user has an access to the object, system will not filter the 
activity done by the user to that object (Sandhu and Samarati, 1994). It can lead the users to abuse 
their privileges, and the system will not be able to control the information flows among the 
objects. Moreover, the existence of Trojan horse program which has the ability to pass the user 
rights without the knowledge of user also brings a significant threat to the system (McLean, 
1994). An effort to extend security on DAC has been conducted by (Sandhu, 1992) with Typed 
Access Matrix Model, which introduces strong typing on Access Matrix Model. But it could not 
omit the main drawback of DAC. 
Because of the vulnerability from the security breach, DAC is not suitable to conduct security 
mechanism over the military organization although it could be accepted in various information 
systems, mainly in the business organization. Military organization needs the high security 
assurance without compromising any risk that is possible to happen. For the military 
organization, MAC is more suitable than DAC since MAC offers more secure mechanism 
(Castano et. al, 1994; Sandhu and Samarati, 1994). In conducting security mechanism, MAC 
applies multilevel security labels to every subject and every object in the system. With this 
method MAC is able to control information flow in the system. But MAC delivers too rigid 
security mechanism. Instead for some military organization especially for the organization that 
has a large number of users and objects, it is not easy to give security label to every subject and 
every object in the system (McLean, 1990; Pernul, 1995; Sandhu and Samarati, 1994). In fact, the 
relation between user and object is conducted in many to many relations, it means a 'set of users 
deal with a set of objects. Thus, defining security label to each user and each object would bring a 
difficulty in updating and administering database. Moreover, the insertion of new user and new 
object in the system especially for those having a new security label cannot be done easily as it 
must consider the existing. The new assignment to the existing user also brings a significant 
difficulty in maintaining database. This drawback can influence the live cycle of data in the 
system. 
The method combining DAC and MAC had been proposed by Denning (1986) with the Sea 
View model. In this model, DAC is represented by the TCB model and MAC by the MAC model. 
TCB model is layered on the MAC model. Although this model is able to solve the problem of 
DAC in controlling information flows, this model still carries the problem of MAC in rigidity and 
DAC in the relation of user and object for the same security level. Considering business 
organization, it almost is impossible to apply MAC in its system. 
RBAC brings a new way in governing access control. This method relies on the function of 
each user within the organization represented by the roles, therefore it depends on the 
organization guidelines (Sandhu, 1997). The privileges owned by the user are limited by the roles 
belongs to the user. It makes the user will not be able to get more privileges than they need to do 
their job (Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992; Sandhu, 1997). Moreover, RBAC supports separation of 
duties for each user following the roles owned by the user. But this method has a drawback in 
handling multilevel data since the user is not connected directly to the access permission. The 
relation of user and permission is mediated by the roles. Therefore the definition of privileges by 
the roles will be resisted by the security level of subjects and objects. Although this method 
.delivers a good security mechanism for large organization in business environment, it makes 
RBAC not recommended for military organization. However it reduces the flexibility of RBAC. 
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The other drawback of RBAC is the incapability in controlling information flow. There is a 
possibility that the user get an inappropriate role by collaborating with system administrator. 
Once the user gets this role, he can access the data following the role without any restriction. 
The comparison of three-access control method can be shown in table 1. 
Table 1. Comparison of DAC, MAC and RBAC 
N 
0 
Security points DAC MAC RBAC 
1. Basis of access request 
permission 
Authorization list Security level Role 
2. System dependency on System 
administrator 
Classification level 
of subject and object 
Function of user 
within the 
organization 
3. Distribution of 
authorization 
Uncontrolled Controlled Controlled 
4. Object owner System and user System only System only 
5. User capability to grant 
an access to the others 
Permitted Prohibited Prohibited 
6. Control of information 
flow 
No Yes No 
7. System maintenance and 
updating 
Easy Difficult Easy 
6. Conclusions 
User access control govern the access request of each user in a certain method depend on the 
requirement of the system. There is no method better then the others. Each method has the 
specific strong points, on the other hand it also carries the weaknesses. To determine which 
access control is more suitable to be applied in the information system need the analysis on the 
requirement of the system. 
Currently information system is implemented following the organization structure. Whatever 
the type of that organization, whether it is a military or business, security must be applied to 
protect data in the system and the system itself. The flexible method as represented by DAC is 
easy to be adopted, but it does not guarantee that the security mechanism brings enough 
protection to the system due to the weaknesses of that method. On the other hand, the very tight 
protection as represented by MAC will bring difficulties in implementation and maintenance of 
the system itself. It even can leak the existence of the over all system. RBAC has the other 
approach in implementing security. It brings flexibility and on the other hand carries a more 
secure mechanism than DAC. However, it is still not adequate to be adopted for military 
organization. 
The idea of bringing flexibility to the military organization as well as bringing military 
security to the business organization still needs to be followed up. The integration of security 
method that can be applied in any system regardless it is a military or a business organization 
needs to be discovered in further research in order to cover the varying system 
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